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THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES: COMPETITION*
BARRY E. HAWK**
I. INTRODUCTION
A TTEMPTS to regulate restrictive business practices on an interna-
tional or supranational level have generally taken three forms: (1)
consultation and cooperation between or among enforcement officials
either through bilateral inter-governmental mechanisms or through mul-
tinational vehicles like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD); (2) binding legislation on the regional level, such
as the Common Market competition rules; and (3) codes of conduct or
"guidelines," either mandatory or voluntary. Such attempts have arisen
primarily for two reasons. The first reason is a desire to mitigate actual
and potential conflicts in enforcement of national laws, particularly
where extraterritorial application of national laws is made. The second,
and more recent, reason is the perceived need to regulate foreign-based
multinational enterprises, a concern most frequently expressed by devel-
oping countries.
These developments in the regulation of multinational enterprises raise
several fundamental questions:
(1) To what extent, if any, has the pre-World War II era of private
international cartels been replaced by an era of nation-state cartels or
nationally encouraged international cartels?
(2) Do the interests of the industrialized countries and the developing
countries differ to such an extent as to preclude or substantially inhibit
international regulation of restrictive business practices?
(3) To what extent are the concerns about multinatiohal enterprises
"antitrust" concerns in the American or even European sense?
(4) At the present time, is consultation and cooperation a more feasible
method or route than formulation of international rules or codes?
(5) To what extent do governmental constraints on, and intervention
in, international trade (which intervention is frequently based on non-
competition and often protectionist premises) prevent oi inhibit formula-
tion of mutually acceptable principles? As a corollary, should such prin-
ciples be applied to all commercial entities, including state and mixed
enterprises?
* This article is an expansion of a report submitted to the USA Business and Indus y Adviso y
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
** Professor of Law, Fordhamn University School of Law. A.B. Fordham University; L.L.B.
University of Virginia.
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In the years following World War II, there were two unsuccessful
attempts to formulate principles for regulating restrictive business prac-
tices in international trade. ' First, the unratified Havana Charter of 1948
declared a policy against international business practices on the part of
both private and public commercial enterprises where these practices
restrained competition, limited access to markets, or fostered monopolis-
tic control. 2 Second, the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business
Practices of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
essentially incorporated the substantive principles of the Havana Charter
concerning international business practices into a proposed draft.3 This
draft, like the Havana Charter, failed when the United States withdrew
its support.4
In the 1970's the formulation of such international principles has been
given an increasing amount of attention. This call for international
regulation of restrictive business practices has received its major impetus
from the developing countries, motivated not so much by traditional
antitrust concerns about cartels as by concerns about the economic,
social, and political power of multinationals and the desire to transfer
technology on more favorable terms than have existed in the past. 5 Many
of these demands are based, wholly or in part, on economic or social
considerations inconsistent with the premises and goals underlying Amer-
ican antitrust principles.6
The United Nations has become the chief forum for such demands,
with several bodies involved.7 The United Nations Conference on Trade
1. For a recent history of attempts to formulate international rules or guidelines regulating
restrictive business practices, see Joelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to
Restrictive Business Practices, 8 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 837 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Joelsonl.
2. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organi/ation art. 46, reprinted in U.S. Dep't of
State, Pub. No. 3206, Commercial Policy Series 114, at 86 (1948). The Havana Charter stated that
certain restrictive practices were generally to be prohibited. These included price fixing, market
division, allocation of customers, discrimination against particular purchasers, production lim-
itations, and illegal extension of rights under patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Id.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade provide3 for consultation among the contracting
parties with respect to harmful restrictive practices in international trade. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3. See Joelson, supra note 1, at 843-44.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., UNCTAD Secretariat, Review of Major Developments in the Area of Restrictive
Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.21159 (1975).
6. See note 28 infra.
7. The following statement exemplifies the tone or concerns underlying many of these proposals:
"The size and scope of the larger multinational corporations make it possible for a few large firms to
control substantial shares of local and sometimes world markets. Because of this, and their transna-
tional flexibility, they can engage in export market allocation, price discrimination, and transfer
pricing, place stringent conditions on the transfer of technology and patents, and enter into cartel
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and Development (UNCTAD), through the Third Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices (UNCTAD Committee on
Manufacturers), is presently studying formulations of both a model law
for developing countries and a set of multilaterally acceptable principles
designed to regulate restrictive business practices affecting developing
countries.8 UNCTAD is also attempting to draft a code on transfers of
technology. 9 Moreover, the Commission on Transnational Corporations,
an advisory body to the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, is formulating a general code of conduct applicable to multina-
tional enterprises. 10
In the OECD,11 there has been considerable activity in the area of
restrictive business practices. In 1967, the Council of the OECD recom-
mended to its member countries voluntary consultation and cooperation
among antitrust officials. 12 A further step was taken in 1973 when the
Council recommended that a member country, considering itself harmed
by the practices of an enterprise located in another member country,
should consult with the latter country. If the home state agrees, it may
order the enterprise concerned to take appropriate remedial action. If the
two countries cannot resolve the matter, they may submit the case to the
Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices for reconcilia-
tion.1 3
agreements that reduce competition." United Nations Group of Eminent Persons To Study the Im-
pact of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International Relations, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development and
on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1 ST/ESAI6, at 30 (1974).
8. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Issues in Connexion with the Formulation of a Set of .Multilaterally
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc.
TDIBIC.2/AC.62 (1976).
9. See UNCTAD, Preparation of a Draft Outline of an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/BIC.61AC.1/21 Supp. 1, at 3-8 (1975).
10. See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations: Issues
Involved in the Formulation of a Code of Conduct, U.N. Doc. EC.10117 (1976).
11. The OECD is made up of 24 member nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and West Germany. It was established in 1961 as a successor to the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The OEEC had been formed as a consequence of
international efforts under the Marshall Plan to coordinate post-World War II economic recovery in
Europe. See OEEC, History and Structure 11-12 (1956).
12. Recommendation of the Council of OECD Concerning Co-Operation Between Member
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, dated Oct. 5, 1967,
OECD Doc. (67) 53, reprinted in Markert, Recent Developments in International .4ntitrust
Cooperation, 13 Antitrust Bull. 355, 370 app. (1968).
13. Recommendation of the Council (OECD) Concerning a Consultation and Conciliation
Procedure on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, dated Dec. 20, 1973,
OECD, Doc. C(73) 99, reprinted in 19 Antitrust Bull. 283 (1974).
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The Committee of Experts, composed of competition enforcement
officials from twenty-two OECD countries, has been quite active. Re-
ports have been published on such antitrust topics as refusals to deal,
market power, patent and license restrictions, export cartels, and mer-
gers. 14 The Committee of Experts also wrote the first draft of the compe-
tition guideline. This draft was later revised in light of comments pro-
vided by member countries, the OECD's business and labor advisory
committees, and interested professional and academic groups. 15
In June 1976 the OECD adopted a Declaration on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises.16 The Declaration includes
three "complementary and inter-connected" statements of policy with
respect to voluntary, non-binding Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, 17 national treatment for foreign-con trolled enterprises, and inter-
national investment incentives and disincentives.' 8 Also included are
agreements on consultation procedures and periodic review by the
member countries. The Guidelines are divided into seven specific sec-
tions, covering general business policies, disclosure of information, com-
petition, financing, taxation, employment and industrial relations, and
science and technology.
This article will discuss the section of the Guidelines applicable to
competition. The purpose is twofold: to describe the concerns and per-
ceived problems that underlie the competition guideline and to offer
interpretations of the competition guideline which reflect those con-
cerns and perceived problems in light of existing antitrust laws,
particularly those of the United States and the European Economic
Community (EEC). The discussion is divided into general comments
on the competition guideline as a whole followed by an analysis of each
provision.
II. GENERAL COMMENTS
While several proposals to formulate mutually acceptable competition
principles or international codes have been made in the past, ' 9 the OECD
14. The operations of the Committee are described in Zisler, The Work of the OECD Conmnittee
of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, 19 Antitru..t Bull. 289 (1974).
15. See Davidow, Some Reflections on the OECD Competition Guidelines, draft of an article to
appear in 22 Antitrust Bull. (1977) (no. 2), at 2 (hereinafter cited as Davidow].
16. Reprinted in OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 7 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration]. The Declaration was adopted by the OECD on June 21, 1976. See
OECD, USA Business and Industry Advisory Committee, Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprise, A Review of the Declaration on International Investment and Multi-
national Enterprise 3 (1976).
17. These are reprinted as an Annex to the Declaration, supra note 16, at 11-17 [hereinafter cited
as Guidelines]. The Guidelines are prefaced by eleven introductory paragraphs.
18. Guidelines, supra note 17, introductory paras. 5 and 6, at 12.
19. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
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competition guideline is the first such effort to gain approval by an
international body. This guideline must be viewed against the back-
ground of the significant increase in foreign antitrust or competition
legislation since World War II, the most notable example being the highly
developed competition rules of the EEC. 20 Extensive antitrust legislation
and enforcement also exist in many of the OECD member countries, for
example, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada. 2' Multina-
tionals presently face, therefore, a proliferation of sometimes conflicting
competition rules and enforcement policies in the industrialized world.
The resultant complexity has been increased in recent years by the
demands of developing countries for regulation of multinational corpo-
rations based on both non-competition and competition policies. Indeed,
the OECD competition guideline should be viewed as a partial response
of twenty-three22 non-Communist industrialized nations to Third World
demands. To this extent, the competition guideline is a political docu-
ment.
The OECD does not contemplate publication of a legislative history or
"travaux pr~paratoires" of the competition guideline, which would aid in
its interpretation, particularly in view of the many revisions made to the
various drafts of the competition guideline. Some of that history is
known, however, and should be looked to in any interpretation of the
competition guideline. Very importantly, the Working Party of the
Committee of Experts submitted its draft to the Committee "subject to a
number of reservations or observations" which follow:
(a) The submission of these standards does not imply that the Working Party has
concluded that restrictive business practices are generally characteristic of multinational
enterprises or that their behavior has worsened in recent years or that restrictive business
practices are more prevalent among multinational enterprises than among national
enterprises. Nor has the Working Party concluded that multinational enterprises are, on
balance, a more anticompetitive force in world production and trade. The function of the
Working Party has simply been to consider what kinds of restrictive business practices are
encountered and to suggest standards of behavior relating thereto.
(b) Standards of behavior dealing with difficult legal and economic concepts such as abuse
of market power, adverse effects on competition and unreasonable pricing policies do not
in themselves provide simple rules for business executives to follow in all circumstances.
Under the national law of various countries, these concepts have been given meaning only
through interpretation by the competent tribunals.
(c) The initial Working Party has not yet concluded that standards of behavior are the best
20. The principal provisions are articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 47-49, reprinted in I Comm. MkL Rep.
(CCI-) 2005, 2101 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
21. See, e.g., OECD, Annual Reports on Competition Policy in OECD Member Countries
(1976).
22. Turkey did not participate in the promulgation of the Guidelines or Declaration. See
Declaration, supra note 16, at 9 n.
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approach to eliminating those restrictive business practices which multinational enter-
prises engage in. However, the Working Party has concluded at this time that the
standards of behavior it has submitted may be of value in helping to achieve acceptable
relationships between multinational enterprises and the countries whose trade they affect.
Also, these standards might serve as a tentative outline for the future development of
commonly accepted international restrictive business practices principles. The final re-
port of the Working Party might contain additional or somewhat different standards of
behavior or might concentrate exclusively on other approaches.
23
Similarly, the United States antitrust official most closely involved
with the drafting of the competition guideline has written:
[T]here was no unanimity [among the OECD experts I that multinational enterprises were
committing a great number of restrictive business practice violations, or that their
behavior was worse than that of national enterprises, or that national laws were generally
incapable of dealing with most such offenses, or that guidelines were or could be the best
international method of dealing with those violations which were incapable of being
remedied or prevented by national law.
24
The competition guideline should, therefore, be understood in light of the
above qualifications and observations.
The stated primary purpose of the Guidelines (including the competi-
tion guideline) is to ensure that the operations of multinationals are in
harmony with national policies. 25 The purpose is not to create a multilat-
eral code of conduct, either voluntary or binding, nor is it necessarily or
primarily to harmonize the competition laws of OECD member coun-
tries. Moreover, while it is true that many of the principles invoked in the
competition guidelines are based to some extent upon rules which have
evolved in certain OECD member countries (notably, the United States
and West Germany), the competition guideline cannot be said simply to
reflect existing national antitrust law. Significant differences in member
country attitudes toward competition policy remain, and it is more accu-
rate to describe the competition guideline as a recital of certain antitrust
concepts articulated in terms broad enough to permit OECD member
countries to interpret them consistently with each country's competition
policies. Thus, it can be expected that OECD member countries will
interpret the competition guideline consistently with their own legislation
or national policies or, perhaps more importantly, according to the en-
forcement officials' views of national competition policies. Given the
substantial differences in competition policy among OECD member
countries, it remains to be seen how much specific guidance the competi-
tion guideline can provide to multinationals. Indeed, should questions
23. OECD, Working Party No. 11 of the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices, OECD Doc. DAF/RBPIWP 11/39 (1975).
24. Davidow, supra note 15, at 6-7.
25. See Guidelines, supra note 17, introductory para. 6, at 12.
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arise as to the application of the Guidelines to a particular multinational,
the Guidelines expressly provide that the multinational be afforded the
opportunity to express its views to the OECD but that the OECD "shall
not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises. ' 26 The
competition guideline must be viewed not as a code or statute applicable
to a particular arrangement or business practice but rather as an expres-
sion of the antitrust concerns of OECD member countries.
The OECD Committee of Experts apparently felt that the competi-
tion guideline could be helpful in, among other things, "codifying
common competition values" and providing general rules for multina-
tionals to follow. 27 Given the large divergencies among national poli-
cies and the broad and ambiguous language in the competition guide-
line, it is questionable whether those two hopes of codification and
guidance will be realized. It should not be concluded, however, that
the competition guideline will have little or no practical significance.
First, it may move OECD member countries toward stronger and
more pro-competition national policies. The possibility of such a move-
ment is very real and substantial, particularly in view of the consulta-
tion procedures established under the Declaration. The importance of
the increasing exchange of information and views among antitrust
enforcement officials of the different member countries and the educa-
tional effect of that exchange on competition policy within each
country cannot be overestimated. The competition guideline is a result
of past exchanges and may very well be itself the catalyst for further
exchanges and cooperation. To the extent that one supports a policy of
competition and free enterprise principles, this propagation of antitrust
principles among foreign nationals can be welcomed by United
States-based multinationals, which already face strict antitrust en-
forcement under United States laws. Second, the competition guideline
must be seen in its political context as a possible basis for future
negotiations with the developing countries within a United Nations
framework.
Before discussing each specific provision of the competition guide-
line, two general comments should be made. First, the singling out of
26. Decision of the Council on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in OECD, International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises 19 (1976).
Trade unions in Belgium have already invoked the OECD Guidelines in a dispute involving the
shutdown ofa plant in Belgium by a United States-based multinational. See Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1977,
at 8, col. 2. At least three new labor disputes have also been the subject of trade union complaints
before the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. See
Financial Times, May 11, 1977, at 4, col. 6; Economist, June 4, 1977, at 93.
27. Davidow, supra note 15, at 7-8.
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multinational enterprises for separate treatment, in contrast with the
treatment of purely domestic entities, may not be entirely appropriate
in the competition area. Most accepted antitrust principles rest on
economic and socio-political premises of competition 28 among all busi-
ness entities, and it is questionable whether a distinction should be
made for antitrust purposes between "multinational" and other busi-
ness enterprises. One result of such a distinction could be to place
multinational enterprises at a competitive disadvantage of vis-h-vis
purely domestic traders and producers. This possibility is somewhat
mitigated in the introduction to the Guidelines: "The guidelines are not
aimed at introducing differences of treatment between multinational
and domestic enterprises; wherever relevant they reflect good practice
for all. Accordingly, multinational and domestic enterprises are subject
to the same expectations in respect of their conduct wherever the
guidelines are relevant to both. '2
9
The second general comment concerns possible invocation of the
guideline by non-OECD members, notably developing countries. For
example, a developing country might informally invoke the competi-
tion guideline when objecting to the business conduct or policy of a
multinational. While, technically speaking, the Guidelines apply only
to operations of multinationals within the OECD member countries,
there is nothing to prevent a non-member country from attempting to
require adherence by a multinational to the Guidelines, at least with
respect to operations within its territory. A multinational faced with
such an informal invocation of the Guidelines (as contrasted with a
formal promulgation of the Guidelines as national legislation) might
point out the ambiguities of the competition guideline. It might further
point out that the Guidelines are part of a broader package dealing
also with non-discriminatory treatment of foreign enterprises and
foreign investment incentives and disincentives. The ambiguous and
broad language of the competition guideline, together with the un-
familiarity of many Third World officials with Western antitrust
concepts, could raise significant problems for multinationals should
Third World countries attempt to use the competition guideline to
pressure multinationals doing business in their countries. Moreover,
the absence of any enforcement mechanism or procedural safeguards
under the Guidelines could aggravate those problems. In a sense, the
28. For the most recent United States Supreme Court statement on the economic and non-
economic goals underlying the Sherman Act, see Continentad T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
97 S. Ct. 2495 (1977), where the Court stated: "Competitive economies have social and political
as well as economic advantages but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations
would lack any objective bench marks." Id. at 2559 n.21 (citation omitted).
29. Guidelines, supra note 17, introductory para. 9, at 12-13.
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"voluntary"30 and informal nature of the Guidelines could be a
double-edged sword if they are informally invoked by a developing
country.
Finally, a serious and fundamental question remains: whether, and
to what extent, the competition guideline can be applied in non-market
or centrally directed economies. Indeed, state intervention and direc-
tion frequently alter the premises and conditions of the competitive
process in so-called market economies. Such state intervention exists to
an even greater extent in the international trade area where balance of
payments policy, national security concerns, and protectionist policies
(to name only three examples) frequently modify or override competi-
tion policies. As the Guidelines apply only to enterprises engaged in
international trade, the extent to which the competition guideline can
or will be interpreted with any degree of consistency remains uncer-
tain.
III. SPECIFIC COMMENTS
This section will analyze each provision of the competition guideline.
The emphasis lies not on criticism, but on an effort to ascertain the
purpose and possible interpretations of the competition guideline.
A. Opening Language
Introductory paragraph 8 of the Guidelines describes which business
enterprises are to be included.3 1 The crucial factor is multinational or
transnational operations. United States-based firms with substantial
manufacturing and sales operations abroad, through either subsidiaries
or branches, would most clearly fall within the above description. On the
other hand, the Guidelines should not apply to a United States manufac-
turer whose sole foreign connection is the licensing of foreign patents.
30. Guidelines, supra note 17, introductory para. 6, at 12.
31. "A precise legal definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of the
guidelines. These usually comprise companies or other entities whose ownership is private, state or
mixed, established in different countries and so linked that one or more of them may be able to
exercise a significant influence over the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge and
resources with the others. The degree of automony of each entity in relation to the others varies
widely from one multinational enterprise to another, depending on the nature of the links between
such entities and the fields of activity concerned. For these reasons, the guidelines are addressed to
the various entities within the multinational enterprise (parent companies andfor local entities)
according to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them on the understanding that they
will co-operate and provide assistance to one another as necessary to facilitate observance of the
guidelines. The word 'enterprise' as used in these guidelines refers to these various entities in
accordance with their responsibilities." Guidelines, supra note 17. introductory para. 8, at 12.
1977]
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Some of the factors listed in introductory paragraph 8 of the Guidelines32
may arguably be present, however, in certain cases of sophisticated and
complex licensing arrangements. Nevertheless, foreign operations con-
sisting solely of licensing do not conform to the ordinary use of the term
"multinational" enterprise which the Guidelines seem to adopt. A second
example of an arrangement questionably subject to the Guidelines is that
where a United States firm's only foreign connection is participation in a
single joint venture with several European partners to manufacture, sell,
and engage in research and development in a European country. Again,
the mere fact that the partners may share knowledge and resources
with each other should not make the United States firm a "multinational"
for purposes of the Guidelines.
The arrangements described in the preceding paragraph are examples,
and they are obviously not exhaustive, of the methods of doing business
abroad. They do, however, indicate the imprecise scope of the Guide-
lines.
Another potential problem for multinationds concerns the definition of
the term "enterprise" as a single overall entity comprised of subsidiary
and affiliated companies and branches. Introductory paragraph 8 ad-
dresses the Guidelines "to the various entities within the multinational
enterprise (parent companies and/or local entities) according to the actual
distribution of responsibilities among them on the understanding that
they will co-operate and provide assistance to one another as necessary to
facilitate observance . . . . 33 The thrust appears to be to apply the
Guidelines to each subsidiary, affiliate, or branch. It is far less clear
whether paragraph 8 is intended to treat the entire multinational as a
single "enterprise" with respect to the Guidelines, making the various
entities thereof accountable for the actions of the others. Under United
States and EEC law, a parent and its subsidiaries are considered as a
single unit only under certain circumstances. While the case law is not
entirely clear, the major factor for single treatment might be described as
"control" by the parent of the subsidiary. Paragraph 8 does not adopt
any standard. This question becomes especially important when consid-
ered with paragraph 4 of the competition guideline, which exhorts coop-
eration with antitrust enforcement officials.34 This is particularly true
with respect to disclosure of information; e g., where a United States
parent is asked to provide documents located in New York to officials of
32. Most notable among these factors is the extent of sharing of knowledge and resources and
mutual influence. Id.
33. Id.
34. See text accompanying notes 148-54 infra. See also Commission of the European Com-
munities, Sixth Report on Competition Policy 32-33 (1977); Griffin, The Power of Host Countries
over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in the European Eg onomic Community and the United
States, 6 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 375 (1974).
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the German Federal Cartel Office as part of an investigation of a German
subsidiary.
The Guidelines also make no distinction between operations through a
branch or division and operations through a separately incorporated
subsidiary. Thus, the form of doing business abroad by a United States
firm should not affect the applicability of the competition guideline. This
is particularly important in that the competition guideline appears not to
adopt the highly controversial and ill-defined intra-enterprise or
"bathtub" conspiracy doctrine of United States antitrust law; i.e., the
fifiding of a conspiracy or combination between a parent and a subsidiary
or between two subsidiaries. The doctrine's principal precedential basis is
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 35 Perhaps the most
forceful statement of the principle is found in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp.: "[S]ince [the defendants] availed themselves
of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations, the
fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the
obligations that the law imposes on separate entities.136
Despite the broad language in Kiefer-Stewart and Perma Life, many
lower courts have indicated increasing discomfort with the intra-
enterprise doctrine and have imposed various limitations on its applica-
bility. For example, several courts have required that the parent and
subsidiary, or two subsidiaries, hold themselves out as competitors."7
Recent decisions emphasize that a number of factors must be considered
and that the mere fact of separate incorporations does not bring the
doctrine into play.38 Other courts have refused to find a conspiracy where
the two entities functioned essentially as a single business unit.39
35. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218(1947). But see
Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962), where the Court
held there was no unlawful conspiracy among three related but separately incorporated farmers'
cooperative organizations, stating- "To hold otherwise would be to impose grave legal consequences
upon organizational distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect .... There is no indication
that the use of separate corporations had economic significance in itself or that outsiders considered
and dealt with the three entities as independent organizations." Id. at 29.
The only Supreme Court case involving bathtub conspiracies in the international area is
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), where it was stated that the
"fact that there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate
them from the impact of the antitrust laws." Id. at 598 (citing Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagrams &
Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1950)).
36. 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968).
37. This limitation is based on language in Kiefer-Stewart that the intra-enterprise rule "is
especially applicable where ...[defendants] hold themselves out as competitors." 340 U.S. at
215. Language supporting this limitation is also found in United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 119-20 (1975).
38. See, e.g., Brager & Co. v. Leumi Securities Corp., [1977] 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
(1977-1 Trade Cas.) 61,379 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1977) (foreign parent and U.S. subsidiary).
39. See, e.g., Giant Paper & Film Paper Corp. v. Albemarle Paper Co., [1977] 5 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) (1977-1 Trade Cas.) 61,351 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1977).
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The intra-enterprise doctrine has special relevance in the international
area,40 most importantly with respect to multinational enterprises. If a
conspiracy can be found between or among the various parts of a multi-
national (e.g., between a United States parent and a wholly-owned
Venezuelan subsidiary), then internal pricing arrangements (transfer
pricing) and territorial allocations may be subject to the prohibitions
under section 1 of the Sherman Act,4 1 under similar foreign antitrust
laws, or under code provisions such as paragraph 3 of the OECD
competition guideline. 42
Transfer pricing and internal allocation of markets by multinationals
are two of the most important concerns of developing countries. For
example, many developing countries, notably those in South America,
prohibit restrictions on a local subsidiary's right to export whether or not
a so-called "bathtub" conspiracy can be established between the United
States or foreign parent and the local subsidiary. 43 The International
Antitrust Guide issued by the United States Department of Justice takes
the general position that the intra-enterprise doctrine does not apply
where the parent has "effective working control" over the subsidiary. 44
While the Justice Department's qualified rejection of the doctrine is
welcome, many interesting and important questions remain open. For
example, a common situation facing multinationals today is that where a
host country requires majority ownership for itself in the foreign sub-
sidiary, with only a minority stock interest held by the United States
40. For several recent decisions involving alleged bathtub conspiracies in an international
setting, see International Rys. v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied., 429
U.S. 835 (1976); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no conspiracy
between a United States parent-manufacturer and a wholly owned subsidiary formed to operate
as export and overseas agent).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
42. See text accompanying notes 141-47 infra.
43. See E. White, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America (U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ST/MD/4, 1975).
44. See Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guide for International
operations, Case A (Jan. 26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Guide], reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH), No. 266, Part II, 10 (Feb. 1, 1977). The Guide contains a potentially significant
qualification to its otherwise lenient stance toward intra-enterprise restrictions: "This would still
allow use of the Sherman Act to reach coercive attempts by members of a corporate group to
drive third parties out of business or out of markets." Id. at 12 n.26. In this connection, see
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws (1955), where
it is stated that "when a parent and its subsidiary, though short of an attempt to monopolize,
nonetheless plan to drive out a competitor, Section 1 may be transgressed." Id. at 35. The Guide's
position toward the intra-enterprise doctrine is generally consistent with prior announcements by
Justice Department officials and with numerous consent decrees which provide that they are
generally inapplicable to agreements and conduct involving a corporation and its subsidiaries or
parent corporations. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,330
(N.D. Ill. 1965).
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"parent"; for example, a so-called "49-51" subsidiary. If the United States
parent continues to exercise "effective working control," then under the
Guide no "conspiracy" will be found. On the other hand, if such control is
not exercised by the United States parent, should a"conspiracy" be found
where the parent is compelled to take only a minority interest? Should it
make a difference whether there is a new subsidiary or a formerly
wholly-owned subsidiary with the stock position subsequently reduced to
forty-nine percent? In this connection, consider the Guide's reference to
United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,45 where the Guide
mentions, among other factors establishing "control," the fact that the
defendant bank had been prevented by state law from controlling more
than five-percent interest in affiliated banks. 46 Does this reference mean
that control may be found even where the "parent" has as little as
five-percent ownership interest?
The OECD's rejection of the intra-enterprise doctrine is generally con-
sistent with the EEC position. The Court of Justice has stated that article
85 is not violated by
agreements or concerted practices between undertakings belonging to the same concern
and having the status of parent company and subsidiary, if the undertakings form an
economic unit within which the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of
action on the market, and if the agreements or practices are concerned merely with the
internal allocation of tasks as between the undertakings. 47
Finally, there is some inconsistency or at least tension in the first clause
of the competition guideline if it is interpreted both to treat the entire
multinational operation as a single unit and also to require that the
multinational, viewed as a single unit, conform "to official competition
rules and established policies of the countries in which [the whole unit]
operate[s]. '' 48 It is somewhat difficult to see how the multinational enter-
prise as a single unit can be expected to conform to what are often
conflicting national laws and policies in the competition area. In many
instances, separate parts of the multinational may be compelled to follow
the varying and sometimes conflicting laws and policies in the different
national jurisdictions in which they operate. For example, a manufactur-
ing subsidiary in countryA may be compelled by the government of A not
to export goods to a particular United States purchaser for political
45. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
46. Guide, supra note 44, at 13 n.27.
47. Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, [1974 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8246, at 9151-57 to -58. But see Commission Decision of
July 2, 1970, 13 J.0. Comm. Eur. (No. L. 147) 24 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder,
Regulations List] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9378 (Kodak); Response to Written Question No.
894/76, [Current Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9948 (May 13, 1977).
48. Guidelines, supra note 17, at IS.
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reasons, 49 while the policies of country B may encourage or compel a
sister subsidiary in country B to sell to the same United States purchaser
for balance of payments reasons. In this situation, it makes little sense to
speak in terms of a single unit multinational enterprise conforming to
national competition policies. Rather, it is a problem of different parts of
the unit attempting to comply with conflicting national policies. The
Guidelines offer no guidance in this situation.
The potential inconsistency or tension in the language of the first clause
of the competition guideline reflects the probable intent of the drafters to
treat a multinational enterprise as a single unit in order: (1) to facilitate
antitrust investigations of local activities through the use of information
obtained from foreign parents and affiliates and (2) to impute "responsi-
bility" to parents for non-observance of the competition guideline by
subsidiaries and affiliates. As the Guidelines are voluntary, without
binding legal effect, and not to be applied to evaluate the particular
conduct of a specific multinational entity, 50 the nature and gravity of such
"responsibility" is quite unclear.51
Two final comments should be noted about the introductory clause of
the competition guideline. First, the term "enterprise" should include any
form of commercial activity; e.g., individual proprietorship, partnership,
or corporation. Second, the clause emphasizes the paramountcy of exist-
ing national competition laws over the competition guideline. It cannot
be overemphasized that multinationals should focus on compliance with
United States and foreign antitrust laws and should not view the compe-
tition guideline as a surrogate. At the same fime, where a multinational is
operating in a country without well-formulated antitrust laws and prin-
ciples, it might well be advised to treat the competition guideline in such a
country as providing an ambiguous identification of likely antitrust con-
cerns.
B. Paragraph 1
Enterprises should . . . 1. refrain from actions which would adversely affect
competition in the relevant market by abusing a dominant position of power, by means
of, for example, (a) anti-competitive acquisitions, (b) predatory behavior toward
competitors, (c) unreasonable refusal to deal, (d) anti-competitive abuse of industrial
property rights, (e) discriminatory (i.e. unreasonably differentiated) pricing and using
such pricing transactions between affiliated enterprises as a means of affecting ad-
versely competition outside these enterprises .... 12
49. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
50. See Guidelines, supra note 17, introductory paras. 6-8, at 12. See also text accompanying
note 26 supra.
51. For example, trade unions have invoked the employment and industrial relations guide-
line with respect to the specific conduct of a particular multinational entity. See note 26 supra.
52. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 15.
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The general concept incorporated in paragraph 1-abuse of a domi-
nant position by a single firm-reflects well-settled antitrust law in many
OECD member countries,5 3 including the United States,5 4 the EEC, 55
and West Germany. S6 Paragraph 1 derives primarily from article 86 of
the Treaty of Rome,57 although it has analogues in several other OECD
member countries where the "abuse of dominant position" is more widely
employed than the American concept of "monopolization. "5 8 As the nine
EEC countries comprise more than one-third of the membership of the
OECD, the following case examples of an "abuse of a dominant position"
under article 86 may be helpful toward understanding paragraph 1 of the
competition guideline: (1) a vertically-integrated United States manufac-
turer with a world-wide monopoly of raw material necessary for the
production of medicine discontinued selling the raw material to an Italian
customer with whom it was competing, or about to compete, in the sale of
an end product;5 9 (2) a United States manufacturer holding a dominant
position (through European subsidiaries) in the West German market for
certain types of metal cans acquired an actual and potential competitor;60
and (3) a United States banana producer was held to have abused its
dominant position by engaging in the following practices: charging dif-
ferent prices (thirty- to fifty-percent differences) in different countries for
equivalent transactions "without objective justification"; imposing resale
restrictions; charging "unfair" or "excessive" prices; and cutting off
supplies to a dealer who had advertised a competing brand. 61
While paragraph 1 of the competition guideline also parallels to some
extent section 2 of the Sherman Act, 62 substantial differences exist be-
tween them. Section 2 prohibits monopolization, conspiracies to
53. See, e.g., OECD, Market Power and the Law (1970).
54. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
55. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 20.
56. German Anticartel Law § 22, [1973] Bundesgesetzblatt 1 918-19 (M. Ger.), reprinted and
translated in 2 OECD Guide to Legislation on Restrictive Business Practices 12 (1973).
57. See note 20 supra.
58. For example, German law prohibits the "abusive exploitation" of a market dominating
position. See Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law, in 1974 Fordham
Corporate Law Institute, International Antitrust 47, 66-70 (B. Hawk ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 FCLI].
59. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission,
[1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 5 8209.
60. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, [1973-2] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171. The court annulled a
Commission finding of an abuse on the ground that the Commission had inadequately defined the
product market.
61. Commission Decision of December 17, 1975, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 9S) 1 (1976),
[Current Transfer Binder] Comm. MAkt. Rep. (CCH) 9800 [hereinafter cited as ChiquitaJ. This
decision, imposing a fine of over one million dollars on United Brands, is presently on appeal to
the Court of Justice.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
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monopolize, and attempts to monopolize. 63 The Supreme Court has
defined actual "monopolization" in the following terms: "The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident. '64
Paragraph 1 is narrower in its coverage than section 2 in.that the former
does not apply until an enterprise has already achieved a "dominant
position" and has thereafter abused it. Section 2, on the other hand,
prohibits conspiracies or attempts to attain a monopoly or dominant
position. For example, under the conspiracy offense, the few courts to
address the issue have generally not required either proof of a relevant
market or any significant.market power. 65 As to the attempt offense, the
great majority of courts require, inter alia, a showing of a "dangerous
probability" of successful monopolization, which is usually measured in
terms of significant market share (although short of monopoly power). 66
Paragraph 1 of the competition guideline seems not to include a conspir-
acy or attempt offense but rather to be limited to what under United
States law would constitute actual monopolization. Other differences
between paragraph 1 of the competition guideline and section 2 of the
Sherman Act are discussed below.
It is instructive to compare article 86 of the Treaty of Rome and section
2 of the Sherman Act with three conditions for coverage under paragraph
1: dominant position of market power, abuse, and adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market.
The section 2 analogue of "dominant position" is "monopoly power. '67
The latter concept is usually (although not invariably) measured in terms
of a market share, with at least sixty-five to seventy-five percent of a
defined relevant market generally considered to be required for a finding
of "monopoly power."'68 The European concept may be broader and more
63. Id.
64. United, States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, $70-71 (1966).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 572-73 (2d Cir.
1961).
66. See, e.g., Hiland Dairy Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 961 (1969). See generally Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 373 (1974); Hawk, Attempts
to Monopolize-Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1121
(1973). The Ninth Circuit, however, has, in some decisions, not required a dangerous probability
of success where the anticompetitive or abusive conduct was clearly unjustifiable on business or
social grounds. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 993 (1964).
67. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
68. See ABA Antitrust Law Developments 53-55 (1975) and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 46
COMPETITION GUIDELINE
flexible with less emphasis on market share percentages. For example,
the following factors, among others, have been relied upon to establish a
dominant position under article 86: access to financial resources, access to
supplies and consumer markets, range of output and geographical spread
of capacity, vertical integration, and technological predominance (par-
ticularly through patents and knowhow).69 Reliance on such factors or
criteria could very well result in the finding or assertion of a dominant
position even though a firm's market share is well below the threshold
figure(s) required under United States antitrust law. A similar result can
be reached under German antitrust law, where dominant market power
is rebuttably presumed if a single firm has only one-third of the market.70
Thus, some OECD member countries might give a broader reading to
"dominant position" than the term "monopoly power" has been given
under United States antitrust law.
Another question raised by paragraph 1 concerns the location of the
dominant position; that is, must the dominant position be in the same
market as that in which competition is adversely affected? For example,
could France justifiably invoke paragraph 1 against a United States-
based multinational that holds a world-wide dominant position in the
manufacture of a product and discontinues selling to a French dealer if
the manufacturer has only five percent of the French market? United
States law usually requires that the abusive or exclusionary conduct occur
in the same market in which defendant has monopoly power;7 1 EEC
decisions are not so clear. 72
The ambiguities as to the location and proof of the dominant position
are illustrated in the following hypothetical. A vertically integrated
United States-based multinational with relatively large access to capital
sells world-wide, owns extensive raw materials, and holds numerous
69. See Chiquita, supra note 61 (access to raw materials and consumer markets); Istituto
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, [19741 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mlt. Rep. (CCH) 8209 (access to raw
materials); Commission Decision of December 9, 1971, 15 J.O. Eur. Comm. (No. L 17) 25 (1972),
[1970-1972 Transfer Binder, New Developments] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9481 (access to
technical knowledge, raw materials, and capital), rev'd on other grounds sub.nom. Europembal-
lage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, [1973-2] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 215, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCII) 8171.
70. See Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law, in 1974 FCLI, supra note
58, at 66.
71. One exception to this proposition may be so-called "two-market" cases where defendant
uses monopoly power in one market to harm competition or gain a competitive advantage in a
second market. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Hawk, Attempts to
Monopolize-Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1121,
1156-62 (1973).
72. See Common Market-Article 86, Mergers, Joint Ventures and Concentration Studies-
Panel Discussion, in 1974 FCLI, supra note 58, at 159, 167-70.
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patents throughout the world; the firm sells its products in the EEC only
in France where it holds ten percent of the French market; the majority of
its sales are through wholly-owned company stores; the firm decides to
integrate forward and terminate its French distributors. A complaining
OECD country (France) might argue that the firm has a world-wide
dominant position (under article 86 factors) which it has abused in France
by unreasonably refusing to deal with French distributors (see example (c)
in paragraph 1), even though the manufacturer does not hold a dominant
position in France. This hypothetical is not offered as an example of
conduct appropriately characterized as an abuse of a dominant position
under paragraph 1; rather, it is offered to illustrate the ambiguities of
paragraph 1 even though that paragraph appears to rest on concepts
generally accepted under United States and European antitrust law.
Finally, paragraph 1 on its face does not cover a "shared monopoly";
that is, a finding of a dominant position of independent enterprises
without any showing of a conspiracy or concerted action among them.
For example, three firms in an oligopoly may be found to hold collectively
a dominant position even though each has a market share under twenty-
five percent and even though there has been no concerted or conspirato-
rial action among them. The "shared monopoly" theory has been rejected
to date under United States antitrust law,7 3 but it is accepted in some
other OECD member countries, notably West Germany. 74
The concept of "abuse" under EEC competition policy parallels the
Sherman Act actual monopolization requirement of "predatory,"
"exclusionary," or otherwise anticompetitive or unfair business con-
duct. 75 Some American examples are horizontal mergers, 76 price or
supply squeezes, 77 discriminatory treatment of customers, 78 and conduct
73. The Federal Trade Commission is, however, relying upon this theory, among others, in
its case against the major United States cereal manufacturers. See Order Denying Motion for
Summary Decision Dismissing Complaint, In re Kellogg Co. No. 8883 (F.T.C., filed Feb. 19,
1974), reprinted in [1973-1976 Transfer Binder, FTC Complaints & Orders] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 20,529.
74. See Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law, in 1974 FCLI, supra note
58, at 66.
75. It should be noted that the exact definition of such conduct has remained elusive over the
87-year history of the Sherman Act. For one formulation, see United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affid per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). For another, see
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally L.
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 33-38 (1977).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Reading Co., 253 U S. 26 (1920).
77. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
78. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
[Vol. 46
COMPETITION GUIDELINE
otherwise constituting restraints of trade (such as price fixing, market
division, customer allocation and boycotts).79 Three "abuses" under
article 86 of the Treaty of Rome were seen above. 80 Abuses under West
German law include, among others, exclusive dealing, tying arrange-
ments, refusals to deal and excessive prices. 8 1 Thus, with certain sig-
nificant exceptions seen below, a United States-based multinational en-
gaged in conduct which would not constitute actual monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act can be somewhat secure that it is not
committing an "abuse" under paragraph 1 as that term may be inter-
preted by other OECD nations. The most significant exception concerns
high or excessive prices which the EEC and West Germany have found to
be anticompetitive abuses.8 2 This contrasts with the United States where
the mere fact that a firm's prices, or also profits, are high or at a
comparatively high level does not constitute by itself either actual
monopolization or any other antitrust violation. Other variations be-
tween American and foreign views of such terminology as "abuse" are
seen in the analysis below.
Paragraph l's enumeration of five examples of abuses of a dominant
position raises two points. First, are the five examples an exhaustive list?
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, from which paragraph 1 is primarily
derived, also enumerates certain practices as examples of abuses of a
dominant position. The Commission of the EEC and the Court of Justice
have interpreted this list as nonexclusive, holding practices not listed to
be abuses. 83 Therefore, European members of the OECD might interpret
an abuse of a dominant position under paragraph 1 as including practices
not enumerated in the list of examples, such as charging excessive
prices. 84
Second, there is some risk that some OECD member countries may
view agreement on the examples as a basis for treating the conduct
specified in the examples as abuses per se, without a sufficient analysis of
a firm's market position or the practice's adverse effect on competition in
a relevant market. Such an interpretation would be a distortion or
misreading of the language and purpose of paragraph 1.
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
81. See Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law, in 1974 FCLI, supra note
58, at 66-67.
82. See Chiquita, supra note 61; Doing Business in Europe, Comm. Mbkt. Rep. (CCH)
30,855 (Mar. 9, 1976) (West German Federal Cartel Office orders Merck to cut prices).
83. Eumpemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 11973-21 C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171.
84. The United States antitrust official most closely involved with the OECD Guidelines,
however, takes the position that the omission of excessive prices as an example indicates the
drafters' acceptance of the United States law. See Davidow, supra note I$, at 11.
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Example (a) in paragraph 1 of the competition guideline is "anti-
competitive acquisitions." This derives primarily from the Court of Jus-
tice decision in Continental Can,8 5 where the acquisition of an actual or
potential competitor by a holder of a dominant position was held to
constitute an abuse.8 6 Example (a) is considerably narrower than the
United States merger provision, section 7 of the Clayton Act,8 7 which
prohibits mergers that may lessen competition in the future. Thus,
section 7 has been applied to bar mergers between competitors holding
less than a ten-percent share of a concentrated market (or a market
with a trend toward concentration).88 Example (a), on the other hand,
seems to follow the EEC practice and applies only where the acquiring
firm already has a dominant position before the merger takes place.
Example (a) would appear, on its face, to apply to any form of acquisi-
tion; i.e., horizontal (acquisition of a competitor), vertical (acquisition of
a supplier or customer), or conglomerate. Also, example (a) does not
specifically mention certain defenses available under United States anti-
trust law, notably that the acquired company is failing 9 or that the
acquisition of stock is for investment purposes only. 90 As these "defenses"
relate to the basic issue of anticompetitive effect, they should be consid-
ered as implicit in paragraph 1.91
The efficacy of example (a) as a guideline is highly doubtful for several
reasons. First, national policies toward merger control and concentration
vary radically among even the OECD member countries. These policies
often change or fluctuate substantially over periods of time. For example,
some countries encourage mergers and concentration for political and
social reasons as well as economic ones. 92 Other countries, like the United
States, take the opposite stance. Moreover, even where a country imposes
merger controls on competition grounds, the question whether an acqui-
sition is "anticompetitive" is a very complex one which cannot be an-
swered in the abstract and which would likely be answered in varying
85. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, [1973-2] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171.
86. Id.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
88. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (7.5% market share plus
trend toward concentration); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (4.49%
market share plus trend toward concentration).
89. See, e.g., Citizen Publ. Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
90. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
91. This position or interpretation is taken by Davidow. See Davidow, supra note 15, at
14-15.
92. Thus, France traditionally has been comparatively lenient towards mergers, at least
between domestic enterprises. This policy may now be changing. See, e.g., Goldman, Antitrust
Laws of France, in 1974 FCLI, supra note 58, at 317, 324-25.
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ways by different nations. It is true that there is a trend among OECD
member countries to establish merger controls, 93 but the philosophies,
policies, and standards reflected in those controls differ so radically that
example (a) offers little or no guidance to a multinational contemplating
an acquisition in an OECD country. Second, many OECD countries
already screen foreign takeovers or acquisitions of domestic firms. 94
Compliance with the formal or informal conditions for governmental
approval of the takeover or acquisition will take precedence over the
OECD competition guideline.
In light of all of the above, the first example of an abuse can be expected
to have no practical effect on United States-based multinationals, except
to the extent that a multinational with a world-wide dominant position
may be faced with an additional objection by a foreign government to its
acquisition of a local operation. Should such an objection be made,
example (a) provides little guidance as to how that objection should or
will be considered, although the reference to "anticompetitive" indicates
strongly that economic and competition policies should be emphasized
over political and nationalistic policies.
Example (b) in paragraph 1 is "predatory behavior toward compe-
titors." Many of the OECD member countries, including the United
States, prohibit certain unilateral "predatory" conduct by a monopolist or
a firm holding a dominant position. Thus, example (b), read in the con-
text of paragraph 1, does reflect a generally accepted principle and is,
on its face, consistent with United States antitrust law. The problem is its
general language which permits wide divergencies of interpretation. In
the United States, "predatory behavior toward competitors" by a
monopolist could include the following practices: temporary below-cost
pricing to harm or eliminate a competitor;9s tying and discriminatory
93. West Germany and the United Kingdom have adopted merger control laws. See Doing
Business in Europe, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 23,510 (Nov. 6, 1973), 24,011 (Dec. 2, 1975).
The Common Market and France are now considering such adoption. See Proposal for a
Regulation (EEC) of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 16
O.J. Comm. Eur. (No. C 92) 1 (1973), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder, Regulations List) Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9586.
94. Such screening is practiced, for example, by Canada, France, and West Germany. See
Doing Business in Europe, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 22,653 (Mar. 9, 1976) ("With certain
exceptions, foreign investments in France are considered 'direct investments,' for which a prior
declaration or request for prior authorization must be made to the Ministry of Finance."); id.
23,154 (Dec. 2, 1975) (purchase of West German securities by non-residents is subject to
approval by the Bundesbank); Bertrand, Canadian Competition Policy Developments and the
Multinational, in 1974 FCLI, supra note 58, at 285, 297-98 (Canada's Foreign Investment
Review Act requires review by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce).
95. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n.12 (1967);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead
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arrangements; 96 and, more generally, "dirty tricks" directed at a compe-
titor, ranging from sabotage and trade espionage to misrepresentations
about a competitor's product. 97
The problem of divergent interpretations by OECD member countries
is aggravated by the fact that there is substantial controversy surrounding
the very existence of some of these practices as well as difficulty in
categorizing particular business conduct as "predatory" behavior. 98 For
example, it is not clear in many situations whether pricing is "competi-
tive" or "predatory" and, therefore, example (b) could be given anticom-
petitive interpretations.
Moreover, example (b) introduces the much disputed issue whether
business activity harmful to a competitor should be proscribed when
there is no apparent or short-run harm to competition (and consumers). 99
For example, a successful reduction in prices to take sales away from a
competitor may seriously harm that competitor without any apparent
harmful effect from the consumer's viewpoint. The first clause of para-
graph 1 requiring that the actions "adversely affect competition in the
relevant market" would seem to limit example (b) to predatory behavior
where an adverse effect on competition can be shown and not merely
harm to a competitor. This limitation also has the benefit of helping to
prevent interpretations which result in anticompetitive effects.
Example (c) is an "unreasonable refusal to deal." This example is
largely consistent with existing United States and most foreign antitrust
law. United States law prohibits unilateral refusals to deal where they are
Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Porto Rican Am.
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858
(1929).
96. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), fJ'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
97. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1951) (newspaper
publisher forced advertisers to boycott a radio station before it would sell advertising space to
them); United States v. International Fur Workers Union, 100 F.2d 541, 546-47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 653 (1938) (threats of violence, actual batteries and bombings); Bailey's
Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 720 (D. Hawaii 1964), qf'd per
curiam, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969) (repeated expenditure of
excessive sums for advertising upon the introduction of new product).
98. Alleged "predatory pricing" is perhaps the best example. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1975);
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1958);
Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1976);
Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L. & Econ. 259 (1966); Yamey,
Predatory Price Cutting: Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & Econ. 129 (1972).
99. The literature is replete with criticisms and discussions of this distinction. Compare, .. g.,
Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377 (1965), with Bork & Bowman,
The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 363 (1965).
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part of a monopolistic scheme or accompanied by an intent to
monopolize.100 Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome has been interpreted to
cover an unreasonable refusal to deal as an abuse of dominant posi-
tion. 101 Indeed, some OECD countries prohibit unreasonable refusals to
deal even by a non-monopolist.10 2
The use of the term "unreasonable" rather than the more frequently
used American terms of "monopolistic intent" or "scheme" does raise the
possibility that an OECD member country might take a stiffer position
toward a refusal to deal. For example, it might argue that a refusal to deal
by a multinational is "unreasonable" even though it is not part of a
"monopolistic scheme." However, the latter term as interpreted under
United States law is probably not significantly different from the term
"unreasonable." In either case, the monopolist must have a legitimate
business reason for the refusal.
The scope of example (c) is unclear in two other important respects:
whether it covers (1) exclusive distributorships or (2) refusals to license
patented or unpatented technology, trademarks, copyrights, and other
industrial property. The answer is probably no as to both. Exclusive
distributorships and licensing are subject to specific rules in most coun-
tries having a developed antitrust law. 10 3 Industrial property licensing
would appear to be excluded from example (c) for the additional reason
that it is specifically covered in example (d) and in a separate guideline on
science and technology. 104
Example (d) is an "anti-competitive abuse of industrial property
rights." The extreme generality of this phrase does not provide any
meaningful guidance in the highly complex area of antitrust and indus-
trial property law. While the United States, the EEC, and several other
OECD member countries have prohibited certain licensing and other
arrangements on antitrust and other grounds,1 0 5 the national rules
(where they exist) vary and conflict to such a degree that at the present
100. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927);
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
101. See Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commis-
sion, [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mlkt. Rep. (CCHj 5 8209.
102. An example is the rifus de vente in France. See Goldman, Antitrust Laws of France, in
1974 FCLI, supra note 58, at 317, 318.
103. For a discussion of the law in France and Italy, see 2 Business Regulation in the
Common Market Nations 323-24, 421-23 (franchising and licensing), 521-22 (exclusive dealing)
(H. Blake ed. 1969). The law in West Germany is discussed in 3 id. at 249-52 (exclusive dealing)
and 279-99 (licensing). As to the Common Market, see, e.g., Reg. No. 67167, 10 J.O. Comm. Eur.
(No. 57) 849 (1967), 1 Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2727.
104. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 17.
105. See, e.g., 1974 FCLI. supra note 22, at 177-270.
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time multinationals must look to them rather than the OECD competi-
tion guideline.
Example (d) is highly important to multinationals, however, not as a
guideline but rather as a signal that many OECD member countries are,
and will be, taking a harder look at industrial property rights like patents,
knowhow, and trademarks. For example, in 1972 the OECD Committee
of Experts on Restrictive Practices stated that the following arrange-
ments might be found harmful under some circumstances: patent pools,
cross-licensing agreements, territorial restrictions, package licensing,
grant backs, and tying clauses. 10 6 This trend toward a stricter stance in
the OECD countries must also be seen as part of the broader concern
about technology transfers held by those developing countries which
would not limit prohibitions on licensing to abuses by multinationals
holding a dominant position as does paragraph 1 of the competition
guideline.10
7
Example (e) can best be understood as having two separate clauses,
each of which covers different types of pricing practices by a firm with a
dominant position: (1) discriminatory or unreasonably differentiated pric-
ing and (2) anticompetitive transfer pricing. The language in each clause
could be given an interpretation by certain OECD member countries
substantially different from existing United States antitrust law.
Three different kinds of pricing transactions could be covered by a
prohibition against discriminatory or unreasonably differentiated pric-
ing, and there is no published "legislative history" indicating whether
such a prohibition is intended to apply to all or some of them. The three
possibilities are: (1) price discrimination among purchasers within a
single country; i.e., a prohibition similar to that in the Robinson-Pat-
man Act;108 (2) price differences between or among different countries;
i.e., a prohibition along the lines of the EEC Chiquita decision; 10 9 and
(3) an antidumping prohibition; i.e., selling or "dumping" goods in a
country at a price below their fair market value in the country of
manufacture.' 1 0
106. OECD, Report by the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, Restric-
tive Business Practices Relating to Patents and Licenses, para. 31 (1973).
107. Third World proposals are far more radical than the OECD recommendations. For
example, developing countries in UNCTAD have proposed a code of conduct on the transfer of
technology which enumerates 40 prohibited restrictions involving licensing of industrial property
rights. See UNCTAD, Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology Submitted by Brazil on Behalf of the Group of 77, at 7-9, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.6/AC.I/L.I/ Rev. 1 (1975). For a revised text of that draft outline, see UNCTAD, Report
of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology on its Second Session, Annex II, U.N. Doc. TC/AC.l/7 (1977).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1970).
109. See note 61 supra.
110. The United States antidumping provisions are (ontained in the Revenue Act of 1916, 15
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As to the first situation, prohibitions such as in the Robinson-Patman
Act exist in several foreign jurisdictions, albeit in a less technical form.
For example, articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, under certain
circumstances, prohibit discriminatory pricing and terms."I Nonethe-
less, such ambiguities and inconsistencies exist within single nations
(such as the United States) that if example (e) is interpreted in the
Robinson-Patman sense, it will inevitably be ambiguous, if not devoid of
operational meaning. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act expressly
provides for certain defenses, notably cost justification of the price differ-
ential and a showing that the lower price was offered to meet competi-
tion. 112 Example (e) on the other hand, is silent as to defenses. Moreover,
the Robinson-Patman Act has been severely criticized as being anticom-
petitive in effect by, among others, the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice. 113 Example (e) should not be interpreted,
therefore, as embodying a general prohibition on price discrimination in
the Robinson-Patman sense.
If example (e) is so interpreted by an OECD member country, it would
appear to be narrower in scope than the Robinson-Patman Act in at least
two ways. First, the competition guideline applies only where a firm has a
dominant position; the United States law does not require an), specific
degree of market power, let alone dominance. Second, the competition
guideline requires that the discriminatory pricing "adversely affect com-
petition in the relevant market," while the United States law will apply
where there is injury only to a competitor or buyer. " 14 Thus, the competi-
tion guideline, unlike the Robinson-Patman Act, would appear not to
apply to price reductions which harm a specific competitor (e.g., by
diverting sales, etc.) without affecting competition in the market general-
ly. 115 Finally, the parenthetical term "unreasonably differentiated" has
no accepted meaning under either United States or foreign antitrust law
and its inclusion in the competition guideline does not make it less
ambiguous than the Robinson-Patman Act.
The second kind of pricing transaction possibly covered by the first
U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1970), and the Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (1970 & Supp, V
1975).
111. Articles 85(1)(d) and 86(c) prohibit "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transac-
tions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage." Treaty of
Rome, supra note 20.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b) (1970). See generally ABA, Antitrust Law Developments 136-40.
143-49 (1975).
113. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Patman Act 257 ,1977)
(criticizing the Act on the ground that it encourages price fixing and price uniformity, particularly
in oligopolistic markets).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
115. The case law under the Robinson-Patman Act is not entirely clear. See generally L
Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 220-21 (1977) and authorities cited therein
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clause of example (e) is that where a multinational charges different prices
for the same product in different countries. While at first glance this may
seem perfectly legitimate in view of differing market conditions, price
disparities across national lines have become a major concern of Euro-
pean antitrust enforcement. West Germany 1 16 and the United King-
dom 117 have brought proceedings in this regard. The Commission of the
EEC has stated that international price disparities constitute an abuse of
a dominant position under article 86 where they are not objectively
justified. 118 This type of offense or theory is not found in United States
law, except in the somewhat different situation of geographic price
discrimination; e.g., temporarily reducing a price in one marketing area
to eliminate or harm competition in that area.1 19 Moreover, one remedy
adopted by the Europeans is to order a rollback of prices or to set a
maximum price; this form of price control has been rejected by United
States courts and enforcement officials as an antitrust remedy. 120 Thus, a
United States-based multinational which sells the same product at widely
different prices throughout the OECD countries must face the strong
possibility that now, or in the future, an OECD member country in which
the prices are comparatively higher may complain that the exhortation
contained in the first clause of example (e) has not been followed.
The third situation conceivably covered by this prohibition is dump-
ing. 12 1 In some cases this may simply reflect disparities discussed in the
preceding paragraph with the complaining countries reversed. That is,
the country with the higher price complains about price disparities and
the country with the lower price charges dumping. Given the absence of
supporting legislative history and the grave potential for conflict among
nations from enforcement of antidumping laws, a multinational can
reasonably interpret the first clause of example (e) as not covering dump-
ing.
The prohibition against discriminatory or unreasonably differentiated
pricing in the first clause of example (e) will most likely be considered by
foreign OECD nations as reflecting their concern about high price dis-
parities among different countries.
116. See Markert, Recent Developments in German Antitrust Law, in 1974 FCLI, supra note
58, at 69-70.
117. See Rhinelander, The Roche Case: One Giant :tep for British Antitrust, 15 Va. J. Int'l
L. 1 (1974).
118. See Chiquita, supra note 61.
119. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co , 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
120. See Rhinelander, The Roche Case: One Giant Step for British Antitrust, 15 Va. J. Int'l
L. 1 (1974).
121. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. The' current version of the Antidumping Act
of 1921 applies to certain price discrimination actions by multinationals operating in more than
one foreign country. 19 U.S.C. § 164(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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The second clause of example (e) concerns the use of pricing transac-
tions between affiliated enterprises to adversely affect outside competi-
tion. As with international disparities of prices in the first clause, the
concerns underlying this second clause are more European than Amer-
ican, and the impetus for its inclusion in the guideline apparently came
from European members of the OECD. The second clause also goes
beyond United States antitrust law to the extent that it attempts to
regulate in the sensitive area of intra-enterprise pricing and profit alloca-
tion.12 2 The clause apparently applies to transfer pricing between
branches or divisions as well as between parents and subsidiaries.
According to Davidow, this clause is probably intended to reach two
marketing situations. The first is "subsidization" of a particular sub-
sidiary through higher profits obtained elsewhere by the parent corpora-
tion. The subsidiary is thereby permitted to engage in local below-cost
pricing to gain entry or increase market share as against unaffiliated
competitors. The other marketing situation is discrimination by a
vertically-integrated multinational against independent distributors in
favor of company-owned outlets, particularly in times of shortages and
other crises such as the oil embargo of 1973-74.123
As to the first situation, below-cost pricing (whether through a sub-
sidiary, affiliate, or directly) is under certain conditions unlawful under
United States antitrust law as predatory pricing. 124 It is far less clear
under United States antitrust law whether using profits made in one area
of an enterprise's overall operations to fund or "subsidize" operations of a
subsidiary or affiliate in a second area in order to gain entry or increase the
subsidiary's market share is unlawful, at least in the absence of other
illegitimate practices. 12 5  Moreover, the difficulties of determining
122. See Guide, supra note 44, at Case A.
123. See Davidow, supra note 15, at 19.
124. See note 98 supra.
125. There is considerable controversy concerning the existence and anticompetitive effect of
so-called "subsidization." See L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §§ 220-21 (1977).
Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) (lawful for a firm to reduce
its profits in one of several regional, oligopolistic markets, so long as it does not act in a predatory
way), and Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968) (in addition to diversion of
business, a showing of structural change is needed to establish violation), with Shore Gas & Oil
Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922, 926-27 (D.N.J. 1963) (injury to competitor due
to discrimination is a violation if, but only if, the low price is supported by higher prices
elsewhere).
Perhaps the closest United States analogue to the second clause of example (e) is contained in
the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-168, § 321(d), 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 164(d)
(Supp. V 1975)) (prohibiting under certain circumstances price discrimination by multinationals
operating in more than one foreign country). See also S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess.
174-77 (1974).
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whether "subsidization" exists are magnified considerably in the case of
multinational operations where internal or transfer pricing decisions are
often made primarily on the basis of tax and financial considerations and
not on competitive ones. 126 The OECD concern with asserted anticom-
petitive abuse of transfer pricing must be seen against the background of
perhaps more vocal Third World concern with transfer pricing of multi-
nationals. 12
7
The second clause of example (e), as it relates to transfer pricing, should
be viewed by multinationals as an expression of the growing concern of
certain OECD member countries and the Third World with asserted
anticompetitive abuses of transfer pricing. It should be recognized that
serious doubts exist whether transfer prices ordinarily implicate antitrust
policies rather than taxation, customs, and other national policies.
Beyond this, example (e) seems generally consistent with United States
law insofar as it prohibits price squeezes and other predatory pricing
action by a vertically-integrated or diversified multinational with a dom-
inant position, as discussed below. The question of "subsidization" is so
complex and controversial that the generality of the second clause of
example (e) provides little or no practical guidance in this regard.
The second situation possibly contemplated by the drafters-
discriminatory treatment by vertically-integrated enterprises-again
indicates a European rather than American influence. As a dominant
position is required for example (e) to apply, limitation of example (e)
to "price squeezes" with an intent to harm a competitor would proba-
bly be consistent with United States law. On the other hand, United
States law does not generally require a vertically-integrated firm (e.g.,
manufacturer-retailer) to sell its products at exactly the same price to
independent retailers as it charges company-owned retail outlets. 2 8
Interpretations of the second clause of example (e) to require such
uniformity would probably be a significant departure from United
States antitrust law, with obviously important ramifications for multi-
nationals attempting to comply with the guideline.
A final ambiguity with the second clause of example (e) is whether
the term "affiliated enterprises" includes a licensor-licensee relation-
ship.
126. See generally 1976 Fordham Corporate Law Institute, International Taxation and
Transfer Pricing (E. Yorio ed. 1977).
127. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
128. The courts differ as to whether a Robinson-J'atman violation occurs where a parent
charges a lower "transfer price" to a wholly owned outlet than it does to an independent outlet.
Compare Reines Distribs., Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), wvith
Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886 (E.D.N.V. 1953).
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C. Paragraph 2.
Enterprises should. . . 2. allow purchasers, distributors and licensees freedom to
resell, export, purchase and develop their operations consistent with law, trade
conditions, the need for specialization and sound commercial practice .... 129
Paragraph 2 concerns vertical restrictions imposed by an enterprise
on downstream purchasers and licensees. A dominant position or
monopoly is not necessary for coverage. Paragraph 2 is analogous to
section 1 of the Sherman Act and article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.
Unlike these two enactments, however, no conspiracy or concerted
action is necessary under paragraph 2, although this difference may
not have great practical significance in many vertical arrangements. ' 30
The various terms used in paragraph 2-such as "freedom to resell,"
"develop their operations," "trade conditions," and "sound commercial
practice"--are neither antitrust terms of art familiar to enforcement
officials and practitioners nor terms about whose meaning there is a
consensus. Given these ambiguities, together with the breadth of the
exceptions or conditions, it is doubtful whether paragraph 2 provides
much practical guidance to multinationals beyond bringing to their
attention certain concerns of foreign countries, both members and
non-members of the OECD.
The primary concern reflected in paragraph 2 is with restrictions on
exports and re-exports imposed by multinationals (and others) on local
licensees, distributors, and other resellers. Third World governments
are particularly sensitive to such restrictions because of their impact on
balance of payments policies and the development of local industries;
e.g., where a United States licensor or manufacturer restricts licensee
or distributor in Brazil from re-exporting or exporting to the United
States. 13 1 The EEC also takes a strong position against any restriction
banning exports from one member state to another (e.g., where a
United States licensor or manufacturer restricts French licensee or
distributor from exporting to the Netherlands) because of its interfer-
ence with the goal of creating a single economic market among the
member states. 13 2 This negative stance toward export bans may be
129. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 15.
130. United States courts have shown extraordinary ingenuity in finding the requisite "conspir-
acy" in vertical cases. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
131. See, e.g., UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology 25-28,
U.N. Doc. TDIBIC.61AC.I121Supp.lIRev.1 (1975); E. White, Control of Restrictive Business
Practices in Latin America, 86-96 (U.N. Doc. UNCTADISTIMD/4, 1975).
132. Establissements Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmBh v. Commission, 119661 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 429, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046. Restrictions on
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stricter than the comparable United States antitrust rules. First, under
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,133 vertical territorial
and customer restrictions are now subject to the rule of reason.
Modified territorial restrictions, such as primary areas of responsibility
and dealer location clauses, were increasingly permitted even before
GTE Sylvania. 134 Second, territorial restrictions within the United
States are permitted where a patent is licensed.135 Third, jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act may not extend to every export ban imposed
on foreign resellers or licensees; 136 e.g., where a United States man-
ufacturer restricts Brazilian distributors from exporting to Japan. These
three qualifications indicate the almost impossible task of formulating
a "code" or "guideline" covering the complex and shifting area of the
law on vertical restrictions. Finally, other United States laws such as
the Trading With the Enemy Act1 37 may require restrictions on
exports by foreign resellers or licensees of United States firms. Thus,
paragraph 2 is subject to an interpretation that not only goes beyond
the United States antitrust laws but which could also result in a
heightening of national conflicts. One can only conclude that para-
graph 2's conditions are sufficiently broad to permit export restrictions
where they are not expressly prohibited by local law.
Several remaining points should be made concerning paragraph 2.
First, joint ventures (and restrictions placed on joint ventures by the
parent partners) appear to be excluded from its application. Second,
restrictions placed on subsidiaries (both minority- and majority-owned)
should not be covered under paragraph 2. Earlier drafts of paragraph 2
did include the phrase "when competitively important, wholly-owned
subsidiaries" but this phrase was deleted in the final version. 138 Third,
exports are a type of territorial restriction, i.e., one where the territory is coincident with national
boundaries.
133. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). The Court expressly overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
134. See, e.g., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Monograph 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting
Intraband Competition 20-25 (1977).
135. The Patent Code provides that a patentee may convey exclusive patent rights in "any
specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see, e.g., Security
Materials Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72 F. Supp. 450 (S D. Cal. 1947). For one criticism of the
general rule, see L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 184, at 528-38 (1977).
136. See Guide, supra note 44, at Case F.
137. 50 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended by Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat.
235.
138 See Joelson, supra note 1, at 868. Davidow maintains, nonetheless, that the language is
ambiguous and that paragraph 2 might be applied to a licensee or distributor which is a wholly or
partially owned subsidiary of the enterprise imposing the restriction. Application would depend on
factors such as the degree of ownership or control, the competitive situation, and the intent and effect
of the conduct of which the restriction was a part. See D)avidow, supra note 15, at 22.
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the phrase "freedom to... purchase" is apparently intended to cover
tying arrangements. It should not be interpreted, therefore, as imposing
an obligation on multinationals to sell to whoever demands. 139 Many
OECD member countries, including the United States, generally prohibit
tie-ins and paragraph 2 as so interpreted is consistent.' 40 There are,
however, exceptions from the general prohibitions on tie-ins, and these
vary among the OECD member countries. Given the broad language and
conditions of paragraph 2, it cannot be expected to provide any practical
guidance with respect to tying arrangements. Again, as with export bans,
paragraph 2 should be considered not so much a "guideline" as an
expression of OECD concern about the imposition of tie-ins by multina-
tionals upon unwilling purchasers and licensees.
The last point, but perhaps the most significant, is that paragraph 2
emphasizes freedom of purchasers and licensors to resell and engage in
other related business activity. In other words, the thrust of paragraph 2
is to prevent coercion by multinationals and not to prohibit particular
vertical restrictions. Thus, paragraph 2 could fairly be read as not disap-
proving or condemning vertical restrictions voluntarily entered into by
the purchaser, distributor, or licensee.
D. Paragraph 3.
Enterprises should . . . 3. refrain from participating in or otherwise purposely
strengthening the restrictive effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive
agreements which adversely affect or eliminate competition and which are not generally
or specifically accepted under applicable national or international legislation . . ..I
Paragraph 3's general prohibition of cartels and other anticompetitive
horizontal restraints is certainly consistent with United States antitrust
law as well as the competition laws of most of the other OECD
member countries. Paragraph 3 roughly parallels section 1 of the
Sherman Act and requires a conspiracy or concerted action among
competitors. Cartel arrangements can include price fixing, division of
markets, allocation of customers, and limitations on production. These
examples are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and are
never permitted even where firms assert economic or business jus-
tifications for a particular agreement.142 The EEC has adopted under
139. This interpretation is supported by the inclusion of "unreasonable refusal to deal" as an
abuse of a dominant position.,
140. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970); article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note
20.
141. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 15.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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article 85 a similarly strict approach, at least where the parties enjoy
some degree of market power. 14 3 Thus, the general prohibition of
paragraph 3 should be already familiar to United States-based multi-
nationals. Given the broad jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act,
paragraph 3 should impose few additional limitations on United
States-based multinationals doing business abroad. Indeed, the qual-
ifying clause "adversely affect or eliminate competition" may be inter-
preted as suggesting a more tolerant stance toward traditional cartel
arrangements than is the present United States position. 144
While paragraph 3's general condemnation of cartels raises no particu-
lar problems for United States-based multinationals, the language of
paragraph 3 suggests two points worthy of comment. First, earlier drafts
barred "cooperation" with cartels. This language raised fears that pre-
sumably innocent activity, such as mere purchasing from a cartel, might
be covered by the guideline. "Cooperation" was replaced by the phrase
condemning actions "purposely strengthening the restrictive effects" of
cartels. While this amendment certainly removes mere purchasing from a
cartel as a proscribed action, it does not remove all doubts concerning a
situation where a multinational is compelled by a foreign government to
participate in or aid a nation-state cartel (like OPEC). A foreign govern-
ment compulsion defense to an antitrust claim exists under United States
law. 14 5
The final qualifying clause, "and which are not generally or specifically
accepted under applicable national or international legislation," is sub-
ject to a plethora of interpretations. Given the high inconsistency and
serious conflicts among national laws and policies and the almost total
lack of consensus on applicable international law principles, this last
clause provides no practical guidance whatsoever to multinationals. For
example, it offers the multinational no assistance in resolving issues such
as relations with nation-state cartels or participation in export cartels
which are encouraged in the exporting country but are per se unlawful
under the laws of the importing country. 14 6
This does not mean that paragraph 3 is a dead letter, for it does
condemn private cartels which are not "accepted" by some national or
143. See Hawk, Antitnst in the EEC-The First Decade, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 229, 249-56
(1972).
144. Perhaps the language is mere surplusage in the sense that cartels inherently harm competi-
tion. On the other hand, the qualifying clause does suggest the possibility of cartels which do not have
an anticompetitive effect. See Davidow, supra note 15, at 24.
145. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.Del. 1970).
But see Guide, supra note 44, at Case K.
146. For example, an export cartel of United States manufacturers, exempt from the United
States antitrust laws under the Webb-Pomerene Act, could constitute a violation of Common Market
and German antitrust laws. See Timberg, Export Agreentents and Export Cartels, in 1974 FCLI,
supra note 58, at 25, 32-33.
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supranational body. Of course, ambiguities abound even here, but fur-
ther analysis is beyond the scope of this article.
Paragraph 3 is not a meaningless gesture for two additional reasons.
First, it is a declaration by twenty-three industrialized nations that as a
general rule their multinationals should not participate in cartels. United
States-based multinationals have already been operating under the same
general rule under United States antitrust law. To the extent one believes
in competition policy, one can welcome the acceptance of United States
antitrust principles by foreign nations. Second, as with the preceding
paragraphs of the competition guideline, paragraph 3 is important to
multinationals not so much as a guideline to follow in specific detail but
rather as an expression of national concerns about multinationals. The
anti-cartel rule may indicate the changing national concerns about the
competitive behavior of multinationals. 47
E. Paragraph 4.
Enterprises should... 4. be ready to consult and co-operate, including the provision of
information, with competent authorities of countries whose interests are directly affected
in regard to competition issues or investigations. Provision of information should be in
accordance with safeguards normally applicable in this field. 4 '
The apparent concern underlying paragraph 4 is the belief held by the
drafters that enforcement of antitrust law with respect to multinationals
is hampered by nonsubstantive obstacles involving service of process, the
obtaining of information, and relief. For example, the Committee of
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices felt strongly that parent com-
panies often possess information highly relevant to investigations of
subsidiaries and that the fact of separate corporate identities has been
used to keep such information from enforcement authorities. ,4 9
147. Davidow, the chief United States enforcement official in the international antitrust area and
the United States antitrust official most intimately involved with the OECD competition guideline.
has stated: "It has become evident that many nations are now more concerned with the unilateral
behavior of powerful, large multinationals or with their distribution and licensing practices than with
the likelihood that multinationals will join in traditional international cartelsof the types that were
frequent in the 1930's. In fact, the references to participating in or otherwise purposely strengthening
international or domestic cartels emphasizes the perceived possibility that multinationals may not so
often instigate cartel arrangements as be put in a position of being induced to participate in or
strengthen a cartel. This formulation, among otherthings, recognizes the propensity of governmental
agencies or governmentally affiliated enterprises, particularly from developing countries, to form
cartel-like arrangements and to put pressure on multinationals to assist in the carrying out and
achievement of the cartdl purposes. The rest of the guideline reflects a series of very delicate
compromises and undoubtedly does leave the advice being given in a less than pellucid
formulation." Davidow, supra note 15, at 23-24.
148. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 15.
149. See Davidow, supra note 15, at 26.
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This broad concern must be kept in mind when interpreting paragraph
4. On its face, it calls for consultation and cooperation beyond the mere
furnishing of information to antitrust enforcement officials. Exactly what
is entailed is unclear and delineation must await any requests for consul-
tation and cooperation by officials. Some possible demands can probably
be ruled out; for example, a United States court would not require (by
imposing sanctions) a foreign multinational to submit to the court's
antitrust jurisdiction on the ground that the multinational must obey
paragraph 4's exhortation to cooperate. On the other hand, multina-
tionals can expect antitrust officials to rely upon paragraph 4 when
negotiating during investigations and litigation.
It would appear, however, that the provision of information clause is
the most important aspect of paragraph 4. It should be kept in mind that a
separate guideline on disclosure of information exhorts multinationals to
publish information on the structure, activities, and policies of the enter-
prise as a whole.150
The scope of paragraph 4 is quite broad. First, parents and sub-
sidiaries are treated as a single unit, and the guideline generally
requires a parent (e.g., a United States-based multinational) to coop-
erate and supply information in connection with the antitrust issues or
an investigation involving a foreign subsidiary. Moreover, the para-
graph can be interpreted to require cooperation and provision of
information to any nation "whose interests are directly affected" even
though the multinational has no subsidiary or branch there. 15 1 Second,
paragraph 4 can be read to include cooperation beyond that required
by national law; e.g., beyond the investigative powers given the
United States Justice Department in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1976.152 Again, it is extremely doubtful that a
United States court would accept such an interpretation even in the
case of a multinational that previously declared its voluntary adher-
ence to the Guidelines.
The qualifying sentence that the "[p]rovision of information should
be in accordance with safeguards normally applicable in this field" is
perhaps intentionally vague, and subject to numerous and conflicting
interpretations. There is no consensus even among the OECD member
countries as to the scope of procedural protections, privileges and
confidentiality. Bluntly speaking, it is doubtful whether there are
150. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 14. See generally USA Business and Industry Advisory
Committee, Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, A Review of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Disclosure of Information (1976).
151. This is the position taken by Davidow. See Davidow, supra note 15, at 27.
152. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 46
COMPETITION GUIDELINE
"safeguards normally applicable in this field." Hopefully, the phrase
encompasses the "safeguards" available under United States law as
well as the laws of other OECD member countries; for example,
confidentiality of trade secrets and competitively sensitive information,
and evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-client privilege.' S3
Finally, the possibility of international conflicts, with the multina-
tional in the middle, is increased by reason of the laws of several
OECD countries which prohibit certain disclosures of information in
connection with foreign antitrust investigations. 54 Paragraph 4 is
silent on this situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The competition guideline is not a multinational code of conduct
reflecting existing antitrust legislation and policies of OECD member
countries. Significant ambiguities exist and differences in interpreta-
tions can be expected given the broad language employed and the
divergencies of national competition policies. Furthermore, the com-
petition guideline in many respects does not appear simply to restate
existing United States antitrust law; in some instances, it may be
interpreted as going beyond United States law.
The competition guideline is most useful as an expression of areas of
antitrust concern about multinationals shared by OECD member coun-
tries. Despite these shared concerns, the generality of the competition
guideline permits each OECD member country to impart a content
consistent with its own national policies. Multinationals should continue,
therefore, to emphasize compliance with national antitrust rules and
policies. The competition guideline is not a replacement of national rules.
The conclusion should not be drawn, however, that the competition
guideline will have no practical significance. First, the extensive work
which went into the formulation of the competition guideline, its accep-
tance by the OECD member countries, and the consultation procedures
provided in the Declaration may very well encourage OECD member
countries (and their antitrust officials) to move toward stronger and more
pro-competition national policies and enforcement. The educational ef-
fect of the increasing exchange of information and views among officials
can be a real and substantial one. Such a movement toward stronger
antitrust enforcement can certainly occur even without a "harmoniza-
tion" of national laws in the formal or technical sense.
Second, it can be expected that paragraph 4 of the competition guide-
line, and the consultation procedures embodied in the Guidelines general-
153. This is the view taken by Davidow. See Davidow, supra note 15, at 27.
154. For example, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands have such prohibitions.
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ly, will themselves encourage greater cooperation among national en-
forcement officials. For example, multinationals should contemplate that
paragraph 4 will be invoked by national authorities in order to facilitate
investigations of local activities by seeking information from foreign
parents, subsidiaries and affiliates. More specifically, paragraph 4 of the
competition guideline may result in increased pressure by enforcement
officials on multinationals to disclose information pursuant to antitrust
investigations and actions.
Third, the competition guideline may also have political significance
as a possible basis for negotiations between the industrialized nations
of the OECD and the developing countries.
